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1. Parliamentary law 
Parliamentary law has been a part of Hungarian public law for a very long 
time, as a specific and clearly outlined portion of c nstitutional law.2 A number 
of authors have ventured to offer specific descriptions. 
József Barabási Kun (1907) first used the term ‘parliamentary law,’ which he 
divided into internal and external parliamentary law in a treatise on the subject. 
He wrote: “Parliamentary law includes all written ad unwritten rules that de-
fine 
a) the overall manner of legislation and authority of the houses; 
b) the internal organization and operation of parliaments; 
c) the relationship of the houses to one another as well as to all other bodies 
of government administration and to the people.”  
According to Barabási, parliamentary rules are partof point b). “However, this 
does not include the portions of parliamentary law found under the other two 
points for they make up external parliamentary law as opposed to internal par-
liamentary law which regulates the operations of inner parliamentary life.”3 
Kornél Pikler incorporated the concept of parliamentary law into a comparative 
study on Standing Orders in Western parliaments.4 Looking at more recent 
studies, Zoltán Szente’s Bevezetés a parlamenti jogba (An Introduction to Par-
liamentary Law) includes the term in its title. According to Szente, the nar-
rower definition of parliamentary law, on which his book focuses, is “the total-
ity of written law, unwritten law, common law, constitutional convention, and 
precedent which define the tasks and authorities of Parliament as a legislature, 
including convocation, termination, organization, operation, order of discipline, 
and the legal stature of its Members.”5 Márta Dezső’s monograph Képviselet és 
választás a parlamenti jogban (Representation and Election in Parliamentary 





Trócsányi writes: “Parliamentary law is considered to be part of constitutional 
law in that regulations governing public administration, labour law and even 
financial law are also part of parliamentary law.”7 
Among public law specialists, the point of dispute is where to draw the bounda-
ries of parliamentary law. In its narrowest context, parliamentary law is gener-
ally equated with Standing Orders, and in its broadest interpretation it is con-
sidered to include the complexity of legislative sources related to Parliament as 
such (including its jurisdiction, organization, operation, election, legal status of 
its Members, etc.) of which common law or legal custom is a part (such as 
Constitutional Court rulings related to Parliament, and laws on legal practices). 
The latter is clearly the full definition, and this complex approach from the 
aspect of law itself is important to the legal coherence of parliamentary law.8 
For instance, without knowledge of the inner logic of the election system it 
would be well neigh impossible to set the minimum number of MPs required to 
form a parliamentary group correctly. This became apparent in 1998, when the 
MIÉP party (Party of Hungarian Justice and Life) made it over the five-per-
cent-of-the-vote threshold needed to enter Parliament, but did not meet the 
minimum requirement needed for a party group.9 I agree with the complex 
definition and consider not only election law but, among other components, 
party law and parliamentary group law to be integral p rts of parliamentary 
law. 
2. Law of parliamentary groups 
The law of parliamentary groups, consisting of the regulations governing the 
groups of political parties, one of the defining inst tutions of all parliaments, is 
a particularly fascinating and unique portion of parliamentary law. The picture 
is really exciting in historical perspective, with e gradual intensification of 
regulatory endeavours in the latter half of the 20th century. A comparative 
monograph issued by the Inter-Parliamentary Union in French in 1961 and in 
English in 1962 called attention to this trend, stating that we seem to be moving 
beyond the time when political groups were considere  theoretically non-exis-
tent. Their importance to political life – together with the importance of the 
parties – is so great that by today they are impossible to ignore… Thus, we are 
witnessing the growth of cohesion and power within these groups.10 Kornél 
Pikler drew a similar conclusion in 1971: “Development trends are clearly to-
wards having parliaments regulate the status of party parliamentary groups in 
conformity with their true significance, eliminating common law with written 
regulation to bring them up to the level of contemporary constitutional life.”11 
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Prior to the regulatory “offensive” there even were opinions to the effect that 
party groups had no place in Parliament at all, since each and every Member 
represented the entire nation. We still rather often come across the idea sug-
gesting that parties and their parliamentary groups operate outside of constitu-
tional life so the law really should not be concerned with them.12 This type of 
reservation is particularly typical of the parliamentary law of the United King-
dom, where the boundary between the parliamentary group and the political 
party is indistinct. Common law, self-regulation, ad political norms (such as 
party charters and parliamentary group rules) play a major role in regulating the 
party groups, even in modern parliamentary systems. 
From the aspect of regulation, the party parliamentary group is a dual entity. 
On the one hand, it is regulated by political norms as a party group, meaning 
that it does not really fit in with parliamentary law, while on the other it is a 
type of organization specific to Parliament with numerous authorities conferred 
on it by parliamentary law. To complicate matters still further, many of the 
norms in the regulatory system are set somewhere between the two entities for 
in actual fact parliamentary group rules are similar to Standing Orders in many 
ways. 
The rules governing the parliamentary groups are generally rooted in one of 
three legal sources: 
− rarely on constitutional level, 
− more often in Standing Orders, 
− party group rules are also a specific source of law.
These basic legal sources are complemented by pseudo-norms, laws governing 
the implementation of the law, and common law.  
As far as the regulation of parliamentary group lawis concerned, there are two 
possible extremes: “either the law ignores the exist nce of political parties and 
their parliamentary groups or it regulates their operation down to the minutest 
detail. Clearly, there are also plenty of options i the middle. In practice, all the 
European parliamentary democracies more or less regulat  parliamentary group 
operation through laws but they are not excessively d tailed or rigid in doing 
so. Thus, they allow practice and custom as well as internal party rules to oper-
ate. Regulations governing the parliamentary groups may not under any cir-
cumstance limit MP freedom in taking political positions, and any such regula-
tion – even if it were not part of a written Constitution – would conflict with 





3. Parliamentary groups in the Constitution 
Let us take a look at the first and by far the most prestigious level of regulation, 
the Constitution. Is there really a need to regulate parliamentary groups on con-
stitutional level? I believe there is. Party groups are highly important parlia-
mentary bodies. In 1971, Kornél Pikler was right on target when he wrote: “In 
their current form the parliamentary groups are rather recent. For instance, 
French parliamentary law has only recognized their existence since 1910. 
However, ever since the turn of the [20th] century, the party groups have been 
increasingly shaping the parliamentary nervous system, initially behind the 
scenes and later openly. Today they are called decisiv  factors of the course of 
parliamentary operations as specified by Standing Orders, just as they play a 
decisive role in rationalizing parliamentary work.”14 
More recently drafted constitutions (such as the Bulgarian, Estonian, Greek, 
Portuguese, Romanian or Turkish ones) are more sensitiv  to the party groups 
although many of them contain but tangential regulation. The Portuguese Con-
stitution could serve as a model, for it declares the principle of the freedom to 
establish parliamentary groups, sets down the most important rights of such 
groups (such as the right to initiate legislation, to initiate the establishment of 
investigating committees, etc.), guarantees their infrastructure and also deals 
with the independent MPs who are not part of any group.15 
Regulation on constitutional level can lead to a positive outcome to a nearly 
century-long debate on whether the party parliamentary group is a party body 
or a constitutional institution. Based on the principle of the freedom of man-
dates, the question can only be answered in the negativ , for the reasoning is 
that a parliamentary group can under no circumstances be considered a party 
component. The UK parliamentary model, where the party groups behave as 
parties, is atypical in modern parliaments. Parliamentary groups are established 
by voluntary groupings of elected Members of Parliament, not party decision, 
and parties or party bodies cannot give them orders.  
The freedom of a mandate is the classic basic princi le of the true parliamen-
tary system. “What, then, is the unrestricted mandate? It is not a ‘historical 
relic’ but a constitutional principle and rule whic, in a form rationalized by 
parliamentary law, contributes to ‘the rule of law not becoming the rule of leg-
islators’.”16 The Hungarian Constitution also sets down the principle of unre-
stricted mandates by declaring that Members of Parliament conduct their activ-
ity in the public interest. The Constitutional Court has interpreted the essential 
content of the principle of the unrestricted mandate in numerous rulings that 
covered both voters and political parties. “The same freedom is also valid for 
the MP with respect to the political party that nominated him or her to the post. 
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The legitimacy of an MP is bound to his or her election, not to the party. A 
party may not employ legal means to coerce an MP to support a party position. 
The status as a Member of Parliament of an MP who resigns or is expelled 
from a political party is maintained in full. An elected MP may participate in 
the work of a party parliamentary group as a part of exercising his or her unre-
stricted mandate.”17 
According to a basic tenet of the Constitutional Court, the establishment of 
parliamentary political groups “is really the exercise of the unrestricted man-
date.” This principle of constitutional law, therefore, separates the parliamen-
tary groups from the parties, for it essentially places the parliamentary groups 
within the fortifications of the Constitution. 
The majority of scholars of public law include the parliamentary groups among 
the constitutional institutions and not the party organs. László Sólyom writes: 
“Political parties have a presence in Parliament through their party groups. The 
party group is an organ of Parliament, not of the party, established at the time 
the Parliament is first convened and founded directly on electoral legitimacy in 
that the votes were given to the political parties … the parliamentary group is a 
separate power factor with bargaining power and not simply a party executive 
body placed within the government administration.18 Márta Dezső wrote that 
“legally speaking, the parliamentary group is a parliamentary body and not a 
part of the party whose members make up the group … A party may not legally 
give orders to its own parliamentary group, so it must choose other means to 
influence it. A party parliamentary group is really two different groups, a party 
group and a parliamentary group, even though it consists of the same people in 
both capacities.”19 
On the basis of all of the above, my response to the question is that the party 
parliamentary group is a constitutional institution. That is the conclusion de-
rived from its historical development, from the enha ced level of regulation, 
from Constitutional Court interpretations, and last bu  not least, from the con-
stitutional significance of the institution, which has become its “nervous sys-
tem,” acting as the foundation for modern parliamentary operations. 
4. Party parliamentary groups in the Hungarian Constitution 
How does the Hungarian Constitution stand regarding party parliamentary 
groups? The first time in Hungarian constitutional history that party parlia-
mentary groups were regulated was in Act XXXI of 1989, which regulated 
them functionally and, let us add, a bit erratically, to meet the ideas of that pe-





groups of the parties with representation in Parliament as well as a delegate of 
the Members of Parliament who are not members of any party are to be in-
cluded in the National Defence Council which is to operate during states of 
emergency. Under Article 28 (5), before dissolving Parliament, the President of 
the Republic is required to listen to the opinions f the heads of the parliamen-
tary groups of the political parties represented in Parliament as well as of a 
delegate of the Members of Parliament, which are not affiliated with any party. 
Act XL of 1990 deleted the phrase on Members of Parliament that are not af-
filiated with any party from the Constitution. This same law added a point to 
the Constitution stating that a nominations committee consisting of one mem-
ber from each of the political parties represented in Parliament will nominate 
the members of the Constitutional Court. These laws re included in the current 
Hungarian Constitution. But all three deserve sharp criticism de lege ferenda, 
although there were historical reasons for including each of them. 
The original argument for Article 19/B (2) was that the National Defence 
Council must include representatives of all institutions authorized to voice the 
national will. The question, when viewed from the perspective of the present, is 
whether this solution meets the other important consideration of a state of 
emergency, which is the principle of effective function, a guiding principle of 
the constitutional amendments that followed the country’s joining NATO.  
Another questionable issue is that if the objective constitutional criteria for 
dissolving the Parliament exist, is there any need for a basically formal restric-
tion to the right to declare the dissolution, which just calls for reconsideration. 
A prior opinion is just a procedural tool and does not bind the President as far 
as content is concerned. It is also true that there are cases, albeit rare ones, of 
similar restrictions in some constitutions.20 At this point, however, I think it is a 
matter of over-regulation, and allowing politics too much scope in public law is 
not always fortunate. I do not want to discuss the manner of nominating Con-
stitutional Court justices here since professional literature has already dealt 
with the matter at length.  
Parliamentary resolution 119/1996 (21 December) on the principles regulating 
the new Constitution of the Republic of Hungary takes a position in favour of 
constitutional level regulation of the parliamentary groups. This resolution 
declares that there is a need to briefly regulate the institution of party parlia-
mentary groups as well as the most important rules of parliamentary minorities, 
and opposition groups. The draft, prepared by the Secretariat of Parliament’s 
Constitution Preparation Committee, envisaged the regulation of the parlia-
mentary groups within the title of “The Organization f Parliament.” “Mem-
bers of Parliament from the same political party may establish groups of Mem-
bers of Parliament (hereinafter: party parliamentary groups) to coordinate their 
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activity in Parliament.”21 The party parliamentary groups are repeatedly men-
tioned in the draft, such as in the discussion of the committee system, the Na-
tional Defence Council, the dissolution of Parliament and the committee nomi-
nating Constitutional Court Justices, where the groups are cited in the currently 
valid Constitution.  
Several Hungarian specialists in public law have also called for regulation of 
the party parliamentary groups within the Constitution. András Bragyova 
wrote: “As far as the party parliamentary groups are concerned, the Constitu-
tion should declare that the parliamentary faction (group) is a body of Parlia-
ment and not of the political party whose policies it upports; it also should be 
stated that a Member of Parliament may belong to only e group at any one 
time. MPs shall be expressly guaranteed the right to resign from a group – this 
is the direct consequence of the unrestricted mandate – and the parliamentary 
group should also have the right to expel an MP from its ranks. In addition, it 
would not be a waste of time to establish a tempus vetitum with respect to 
transferring from one parliamentary group to another.”22 In this proposal we 
already see the appearance of a very important element of the public law defi-
nition of party parliamentary group, namely that the party group is a body made 
up in the image of Parliament. The party parliamentary group can of course be 
defined and described in a variety of ways. There have been multiple attempts 
to do so, particularly in political science studies.23 Staying with the public law 
approach, Krisztián Gáva wrote: “The parliamentary g oup is an independent 
(working) organization within the Parliament – whic even may have legal 
entity – established voluntarily by Members of Parliament, which is more or 
less separate from the political party of the PMs. These groups exist in most 
European parliaments.”24 Constitutional Court rulings will also promote future 
fuller Constitution-level regulation of the parliamentary groups. The main con-
clusions of the Constitutional Court regarding the parliamentary groups are as 
follows: 
– the parliamentary groups are constitutional, 
– provisions of the Constitution assume that they exist and operate, 
– establishing them is a requirement of the Constitution, 
– organized action by the parliamentary groups within Parliament is a fun-
dament of parliamentary operation. 
The Constitutional Court cannot take on the job of defining the concept of the 
party parliamentary group, but it has outlined the boundaries of the definition. 
“The definition of the institution of party parliamentary group must serve to 
make parliamentary operations effective and stable, considering the tasks the 
parties face in a modern representative democracy. The party parliamentary 





opinion. Through their work, the parties can effectively do their constitutional 
job of relaying the will of the people. The party parliamentary groups are es-
sential to the structuring of parliamentary debate. They make it possible to pre-
sent and contrast several polished positions as opposed to several hundred spo-
radic individual opinions. The effectiveness thus attainable is served by the 
authorities granted not to the various MPs but exprssly to the parliamentary 
groups (which represent the MPs).”25  
How might the party parliamentary groups be regulated within the Constitu-
tion? I believe it might be done as follows: “The organized activity within Par-
liament of the political parties participating in shaping and declaring the will of 
the people is the foundation of parliamentary operations. Members of Parlia-
ment who belong to the same party may join based on their unrestricted man-
dates and establish parliamentary groups to coordinate their activity within 
Parliament. The establishment of parliamentary groups is a requirement of the 
Constitution. The groups of Members of Parliament are the work organizations 
of Parliament.” 
5. The legal nature of Standing Orders 
Standing Orders are the traditional, highly significant and specific sources of 
parliamentary law, containing detailed regulations  parliamentary convoca-
tion, organization, and order of debate, and last but not least, on the rights of 
Members and parliamentary groups. The legal nature must be touched on to 
determine whether the party parliamentary groups are truly regulated by law. 
The fact is that Standing Orders are the supreme sources of parliamentary 
group law. The extent to which Standing Orders are sourced in law and their 
legal nature have been the subjects of debate for a ve y long time. Contempo-
rary Hungarian statutory law and the Constitutional Court practice based on it 
treat Standing Orders as a miscellaneous legal tool of state management. In this 
interpretation the Standing Orders do not qualify as law.26  
Many scholars dispute this degree of “degrading” of Standing Orders as a 
source of law, including the author of this article. This concept of Standing 
Orders is a break from a concept of Hungarian public law that has existed since 
Act IV of 1848, which specifically set Standing Orde s as law, a specific 
source of law which did not even have to be shown to the monarch as did leg-
islative acts, because there was autonomy in the passing of Standing Orders.27 
In a study on state law published in 1916, László Buza wrote: “In treatises on 
Hungarian public law, everyone considers Standing Orders to be law, with the 
binding force of law. Without exception, our public aw textbooks state that 
Standing Orders are sources of law and they treat them as such … Without 
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exception, our statesmen and politicians are of this view.”28 When presenting 
the major models of Western European Standing Orders as sources of law, in 
1971 Kornél Pikler concluded that the dominant theory generally placed 
Standing Orders ahead of ordinary law.”29 Sándor Pesti used the content specif-
ics of Standing Orders and the subjects they regulate as his point of departure 
when he recommended that “it would be best if they were defined as sui 
generis legal norms in their own right that cannot be placed in any category.”30 
I agree that when defining the legal nature of the Standing Orders, the funda-
mental point of departure should be their relationship to the Constitution.31 
Following the French model, Article 24 (4) of the Hungarian Constitution au-
thorizes the Parliament to establish this specific source of law and to require a 
two-thirds majority of the Members of Parliament present to establish these 
norms. However, I recognize that the Constitution des not specify that the 
Standing Orders qualify as law or other rule of lega  stature. Choice of the form 
is a part of parliamentary autonomy. The Parliament acted according to its own 
tradition in adopting the Standing Orders of the Parliament of the Republic of 
Hungary with a decision, 46/1994 (30 November). However, denial of the legal 
nature of Standing Orders is not the logical conclusion of the forgetfulness in 
setting the rules. 
Although I cannot dispute the fact that in general it is difficult to define an ex-
traordinarily specific source of law, the legal nature of the Standing Orders and 
their significance to the study of legal sources as well as their close connection 
to the Constitution (Standing Orders are the immediat  executor of many 
stipulations of the Constitution!), the consensus requirement for adopting them 
set in the Constitution, their mandatory nature, and the norms they contain, 
raise them above ordinary law in my view. The jurisdiction of Standing Orders 
goes far beyond Members of Parliament and Parliament’s own organization 
such as the party parliamentary groups, for they also have a direct effect on 
other organizations and even on the citizens. For evidence, we need only think 
of the activity of the investigations committees.32 The question is that if Stand-
ing Orders are placed above ordinary law, must theydefinitely be adopted as 
legislation such as several public law scholars have recommended and as con-
tained in the draft of the new Constitution.33 
I believe that the constitutional authority may, in the future, issue legislative 
authorizations using the term “Standing Orders.” The place where this specific 
type of law belongs in the legal system is close to the Constitution and above 
ordinary law. Given the autonomy of the House of Parliament, the President of 
the Republic should have the authority to employ a constitutional veto against 
Standing Orders but not to impose a political veto. This constitutional position 





6. The parliamentary groups of parties in the Standing Orders 
There are two major and increasingly robust areas of regulation in the Standing 
Orders that cover party parliamentary groups:34 
– the first concerns the establishment of parliamentary groups (less often, 
the termination of them), movement from one parliamentary group to 
another, rules of resignation and expulsion, and the status of independ-
ents in this particular context. Standing Orders generally regulate these 
issues in a single chapter and in a coherent manner.  
– the second is a cataloguing of the rights of parliamentary groups, gener-
ally as functional regulations connected to the various parliamentary in-
stitutions (such as taking the floor before the house proceeds with its 
agenda, initiating legislation, etc.). 
Modern Standing Orders definitely centre on the party political groups and not 
on the rights of individual MPs. Nevertheless, there is significant scope open to 
classic MP rights that are specified in the Constitution (such as the right to 
initiate legislation and the right to ask questions). In 1994 this debate was re-
solved in a comparatively balanced manner in Hungary when the new Standing 
Orders were adopted and clearly supported the rights of parliamentary groups.35 
Also typical of Standing Orders is the way they legally distinguish between the 
two subtypes of party parliamentary group, the government groups and the 
opposition groups, and guarantee opposition rights. 
As far as the former major regulatory sphere is concer ed, this paper has al-
ready noted that the formation of party parliamentary groups is based on the 
right of MPs to join forces and on the principle of the unrestricted mandate. 
However, the freedom to form party parliamentary groups is not unlimited and 
all of parliamentary law sets numerous restrictions. Comparative studies on 
constitutional law that deal with parliamentary law have pinpointed the ex-
traordinarily varied restrictions in specific national laws, often intended to 
manage local concerns, as follows:36 
– identical political positions are required to form groups – group forma-
tion is the right of MPs who are in the same party, 
– each party may have only one parliamentary group, an MP may belong 
to only one group, no one may be forced to choose a parliamentary 
group, an MP does not necessarily have to be a member of a party to join 
its group, 
– it is considered generally desirable to set the mini um number of MPs 
required to form a party group, 
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– in contrast with party pluralism, groups (based on regions, professions or 
other common factor) may not be formed or if they are llowed they are 
limited and require approval – where they exist, these groups are differ-
ent in status from party parliamentary groups, 
– the unrestricted mandate gives MPs the right to resign from a party 
parliamentary group, while parliamentary group autonomy gives the 
group the right to expel a Member, 
– parliamentary law does not try to restrict the freedom to resign but it 
does raise obstacles to shifting to another group, to “changing battle 
dress” by introducing a cooling off or waiting period, thus protecting the 
choice made by the voter on election day, 
– there are several models for independents, the two extremes of which are 
recognition of each as an independent group and complete denial of in-
dependent group formation. Generally, a mixed solution which tolerates 
their rights including group rights is typical. 
This paper will only touch on the latter regulatory issue, the rights of parlia-
mentary groups. The rights of parliamentary groups are collective rights and it 
is assumed that the heads of the groups and their deputies, specifically included 
in many portions of parliamentary law, are acting i the name of their parlia-
mentary group. 
Parliamentary law regulates the rights of party parliamentary groups according 
to four basic principles: dominant order, proportionality, parity, and equality of 
party parliamentary groups. Where do we see the most exercise of parliamen-
tary group rights? 
– First of all, they are the “initial movers” of Parli ment, the institutional 
participants in setting the agenda and preparing parliamentary schedules 
and working order, generally on the basis of the principle of the equality 
of parliamentary groups, 
– the parliamentary groups submit proposals nominating parliamentary of-
ficers based on dominant order, on the distribution of committee seats 
generally based on the proportionality principle but sometimes on parity, 
– their rights can be typified along the lines of the main functions of 
Parliament, first of all in shaping legislation (such as in initiating legis-
lation or amendment proposals) and in direct political functioning 
spheres (such as initiating political debate and taking the floor before de-
bate begins on the day’s agenda), 
– there are also procedural parliamentary group rights linked to the order 






The catalogue of rights that the various party parliamentary groups may access 
independently tells us much about the law governing the given Parliament. It is 
generally known that Standing Orders generally set a comparatively low mini-
mum number of persons required to form a party parliamentary group. The 
actual numbers can be used to evaluate the various right to take initiatives and 
to participate, ranging from the rights of an indivi ual mandate through the 
rights of party parliamentary groups on to the institutions that call for larger 
proportions. For instance, it is a matter for consideration whether initiating a 
vote of no confidence is the right of a parliamentary group (see Portuguese 
Constitution) or whether a larger number of MPs are required (such as one-
fourth or one-fifth of the Members) to make the initiat ve. In other words, are 
the rights regulated as opposition rights that can be exercised in the specific 
institutions irrespectively of the will of the majority? The answer always de-
pends on the political spectrum and party system of the given country. 
7. Party parliamentary groups in Hungarian Standing Orders 
Let us now focus on the domestic scene and see how Hungarian “internal” par-
liamentary law regulates the party parliamentary groups. The rights of parlia-
mentary groups were established in the constitutional regime change of 
1989/90. The first legislation to be adopted to this effect was Parliamentary 
Resolution 8/1989 (8 June) on Amending the Standing Orders of Parliament 
and Amendments of the Standing Orders. 
According to Article 16 of the 1989 Standing Orders, Members of Parliament 
representing political parties and MPs who did not belong to any party were 
permitted to establish parliamentary groups to coordinate their activity as 
Members. Ten MPs were required to establish a parliamentary group. The 
Standing Orders also allowed groups not based on party luralism to form.37 
When a party-based parliamentary group was formed, the fact, the name of the 
group and the names of the chair and members had to be reported to the 
Speaker. In essence, the 1994 Standing Orders, which continue to be valid, 
have maintained this system of regulation with the difference that the inde-
pendents were dropped out of the list of persons who can form party groups, 
the terminology which said “parties with representatives in Parliament” was 
changed, and the minimum number of persons required to form a party parlia-
mentary group was raised from ten to fifteen. 
Having a representation in Parliament, which, under th  electoral system, might 
be a single MP, does not necessarily include the right to form a party parlia-
mentary group, said the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court an-
nulled the rule requiring a fifteen-person minimum to establish a parliamentary 
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group as of June 2, 1998 – a number that is still valid for terminating a parlia-
mentary group under current Standing Orders. According to the ruling, the 
requirement for fifteen persons is not of itself unco stitutional, but it becomes 
so when it contradicts the electoral system. Parliament may regulate the num-
ber of persons needed to establish a parliamentary group in several ways.38 In 
fact, to this day Parliament has been unable to agree on a minimum number of 
MPs allowed to form a Parliament group that would be in conformity with the 
electoral system. This is a major shortcoming of Hungarian parliamentary law, 
even though the Constitutional Court ruling did notinclude a concrete deadline 
for augmenting the Standing Orders. 
I believe it would be expedient to declare that anyparty managing to exceed 
the five-percent-of-the-vote threshold needed to enter Parliament also had the 
right to form a parliamentary group. In all probability, the five-percent rule 
means a minimum of 8-10 seats. In other words, since 1998, there is no mini-
mum requirement to form a parliamentary group in Hungarian parliamentary 
law. In other words, in principle even one or two MPs could form such a group. 
That is not unprecedented in parliamentary law. For instance, the upper house 
of the Australian Parliament adopted a ruling under which a single senator may 
form a separate group,39 and groups of 2-5 persons also exist. At the same ti e,
Hungarian parliamentary practice rejects “frivolous” initiatives.40 
The 1994 Standing Orders contained a separate chapter that regulated the par-
liamentary groups in detail, using the principles we see in European Standing 
Orders. In other words: 
– the sole basis for forming a parliamentary group is arty pluralism, and 
no other groups of MPs qualify as parliamentary groups insofar as the 
Standing Orders are concerned,41 
– one party may have only one parliamentary group, and while an MP does 
not necessarily have to be a party member to join its group, he or she 
may not hold membership in more than one group, 
– an MP may resign from a parliamentary group, after which he or she be-
comes an independent. He or she may join another parliamentary group 
after a six month interim period, 
– the Standing Orders contain regulations on the internal organization and 
operation of the parliamentary groups. For instance, th  group chooses 
its parliamentary group leader and deputy leader from among its mem-
bers, the parliamentary group may dissolve itself, may expel a Member, 
and may agree to allow an independent MP to join it, 
– the Standing Orders contain guarantees regarding the financial opera-
tions of the group of MPs. Act LXVI of 1990 on the onoraria, cost cov-






The group is required to submit a written report of events and factors related to 
the parliamentary group (establishment, termination, name, list of officials, list 
of Members) to the Senior Member of Parliament at the convening session of 
Parliament following the oath of office, or to the Speaker of Parliament if they 
occur while Parliament is in session. The autonomy f the parliamentary group 
is manifest in the fact that the Speaker cannot reverse a decision. He or she may 
only examine it for conformity with the Standing Orde s (for instance, did the 
report truly come from the head of the parliamentary group and was it submit-
ted in writing?).42 
I have already indicated that in this study I will not look into the details of the 
second large area of regulation, the catalogue of parliamentary group rights – a 
matter extensively discussed by several authors. At the same time, I would like 
to note that it would be expedient to reconsider  lege ferenda the institution 
of parliamentary group rights in the various bodies. This reconsideration is 
important because the Standing Orders have very corectly regulated the details 
of parliamentary group rights. Of the 148 paragraphs of Standing Orders that 
continue to be valid (actually 170 paragraphs in all), nearly 40 are concerned 
with the rights of groups. In other words, one in every four focuses on the 
groups. In some cases the Standing Orders relegate direct rights to the party 
parliamentary groups (such as the right to call for an open roll-call ballot or to 
initiate a parliamentary decision on the interpretation of a Standing Orders), 
while in others it speaks of “at least fifteen MPs” (for instance, when setting its 
agenda, when concluding a debate, and so on.). The opportunity for any MP to 
submit an initiative (for instance, for a closed session) should be reconsidered 
as should the requirement for larger minimum numbers of MPs, such as the 
rule of one-fifth (to initiate a special session, to establish an investigations 
commission, to conduct a political debate, to postpne a meeting of Parliament) 
from the point of view of parliamentary group rights. The four principles of the 
Standing Orders: order of dominance, proportionality, parity, and the equality 
of the parliamentary groups should be vetted against each other. 
Where do we see truly characteristic rights for parliamentary groups within 
parliamentary law? We see them where the legal regulation is based on the 
equality of the groups. Such areas include participation in the House Commit-
tee, which can be convened by any parliamentary group (Standing Orders Arti-
cles 24 and 26), speaking off the agenda (Standing Orders Article 51), submit-
ting a bill for debate (Standing Orders Article 98), reviving a draft amendment 
(Standing Orders Article 106) interpreting Standing Orders (Standing Orders 
Article 143) and so on. 
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8. The parliamentary groups in Hungarian parliamentary practice 
The following table contains the parliamentary groups in the four terms of Par-
liament we have seen since the constitutional regim change of 1989/90. Col-
umn one in the table contains the numbers of people in the parliamentary 
groups announced on the date of the convening session of Parliament. Column 
two gives us the numbers at the end of the term, which indicates restratifica-
tion, the appearance of new party groups (MIÉP, MDNP) the possible dis-
banding of parliamentary groups (KDNP), and the appe rance of independents. 
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Now, I would like to briefly outline four issues based on parliamentary case 
law. They are the question of establishing a parliamentary group in the midst of 
a term of Parliament, the problems related to terminating a parliamentary 
group, movement from one group to another involving both resignations and 





9. New parliamentary groups in mid-term 
If we look at the table, we will see that two parlimentary groups were estab-
lished in mid-term in conformity with Standing Ordes, although these were not 
the only ones initiated. 44 In the middle of the first term of Parliament, the 
MIÉP party group (at that time just called the MI [Hungarian Justice] Party 
group) announced its formation at the July 1, 1993 session of Parliament but 
was only able to begin operations de jure on September 1, after the party had 
been registered by the court.45 In the second term, 17 MPs announced the 
foundation of the MDNP parliamentary group to the Speaker in a document 
dated March 11, 1996. The responsible committees and the Parliament itself 
found that the group was in conformity with the rules, interpreting them to the 
effect that the six month waiting period was not valid for “collective resigna-
tions.”46  
What are the problems of principle raised by the establishment of a parliamen-
tary group in the midst of a term? This also means that parties other than ones 
that ran in parliamentary elections and won their place in Parliament could 
form groups but so could any group of MPs breaking off from one party and 
forming another in the interim. Obviously, the unrest icted mandate would 
come up against a hard and unconstitutional barrier if the only parties allowed 
to form parliamentary groups were those already in ex stence at the time of the 
elections.47 That is the view expressed by the Constitutional Court interpreta-
tion. “… If parties split and new ones are formed during the term of Parliament, 
and if the Members of Parliament choose to represent th se new parties which 
did not originally exist at the time of the elections, the legitimacy of these par-
ties in Parliament is derived not directly from thewill of the electorate but from 
the legitimacy of the Members of Parliament.”48 The Standing Orders to the 
contrary, which prohibited this from 1995 to 1998 and occurred in Standing 
Orders drafts dated earlier than 1994, would no doubt be considered unconsti-
tutional.49 
I cannot fully agree with an interpretation giving the unrestricted mandate full 
value while considering the order of parliamentary seating determined by elec-
tions to be completely irrelevant. Parliamentary law must protect the result of 
an election that expresses the sovereign will of the electorate. A Parliament that 
allows its seating order to become significantly different from the one estab-
lished at its initial session does not conform to this principle. 
We see that parliamentary groups can be formed in the midst of a parliamen-
tary term. However, this is an atypical group (because it was not declared at the 
convening session of Parliament and because the electorate did not vote for this 
party or its platform). Therefore a separate permit or approval from Parliament 
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should be required, something that is true for other ypes of groups. Above and 
beyond requiring the court to register the party, it must also have a minimum 
number of MPs as set in the Standing Orders (or at least the number which 
would correspond to the minimum 5 percent of the vote needed to enter Par-
liament in the first place). 
10. Terminating a parliamentary group 
According to effective Standing Orders, a parliamentary group shall be termi-
nated if the number of members in it drops below fifteen or if the group dis-
solves itself. The first case is an objective cause for termination and the second 
is a subjective one. A small parliamentary group may be terminated by the 
objective rule. Given the objective operation of the mixed election system em-
ployed by Hungary, smaller groups generally come about from party lists as 
opposed to individual constituencies, with most mandates coming from the 
national lists. For this reason, Standing Orders Article 17 (3) states that a man-
date acquired from a list is not terminated, even if vacated, and is to be refilled 
from the list.50 
Constitutional Court ruling 27/1998 (16 June) only annulled the minimum 
number requirement with respect to establishing a group for it did not offer any 
real guidelines concerning group termination. Until Parliament sets a minimum 
number requirement for establishing a group, the number of MP members de-
clared at the founding session becomes the minimum. The question then is, 
whether that is automatically true for group termination? 
Standing Orders Article 17 (3) does not really appear to exist in parliamentary 
law. Dropping below fifteen persons has not affected the status of party parlia-
mentary groups that were founded in conformity with the rules.51 The only MP 
group that was terminated in conformity with the rules was the party parlia-
mentary group of the KDNP party, whose membership dro ped below 15 per-
sons as a result of expulsions and resignations.52 Termination of a party parlia-
mentary group has numerous legal repercussions includi g loss of the rights of 
a party parliamentary group. For instance, the group loses its officials and 
committee slots, and its status in the House Committee. The statuses of the 
members of the KDNP party parliamentary group were lost in three different 
ways: through expulsion, resignation, and through termination of the group 
itself. The Standing Orders do not cover the latter case, when termination of the 
party parliamentary group turns the MPs into independents. Here we need to 
ask whether the six-month cooling off period has to be maintained in this case, 
too, or can an MP immediately join another party parliamentary group. Under a 





independent for reasons other than resignation and expulsion may become 
members of another group without the six-month waiting period. Parliament 
approved this interpretation.53 
Another interesting precedent with respect to termination is whether the origi-
nal party parliamentary group declared at the opening session of Parliament is 
qualified as having been retained if the party itself walks out on the MPs.54 In 
other words, can a group without a party to back it up be considered a party 
parliamentary group of the given party. The Constitutional and Justice Com-
mittee has taken a position that a party may have only one parliamentary group. 
This conclusion is laudable and in conformity with the Standing Orders. How-
ever, the argument that the personal composition of the party parliamentary 
group “does not have a re-shaping effect under public law” is questionable if 
the fact is that the party behind the parliamentary group has become completely 
rearranged.55 Obviously, the party parliamentary groups are establi hed and 
terminated apart from the parties themselves, but the basic principle is that the 
grouping is based on party pluralism. This matter would also need more precise 
regulation in the Standing Orders. 
I believe that group termination should be regulated differently from group 
formation with more focus on concrete factors. An automatic adherence to a 
minimum number is not a good rule. There can be numerous reasons why a 
group that numbers 10-15 MPs at the start of Parliament may lose members 
(such as death or resignation from Parliament). That does not negate Election 
Day will, which found the parliamentary group to have been established by the 
rules. I think some affirmative action rule might be imposed, such as one say-
ing that a group shall only be terminated if its memb rship declines to less than 
three-quarters of the declared minimum for group formation. 
11. Changes in seating order 56 
Parliament’s seating order was established to show the party parliamentary 
groups and through them, the political differences that evolve through social 
change. The seating order of the convening sessions faithfully reflects the re-
sults of the changes. The same is not true for the seating order of the same par-
liaments by the time their term of office ends. There is regrouping and move-
ment within Parliament even in countries with stable multi-party systems. 
There are two forms of change in seating orders. One is the “fluctuation” when 
an MP mandate is terminated, and the other is when a party parliamentary 
group reorganizes because of resignations or expulsions from the group that do 
not affect the parliamentary mandate.  
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Given the mixed electoral system in Hungary, fluctuation can change the po-
litical map within Parliament for there are 176 indivi ual consistencies in 
which by-elections may need to be held, and the winner of these seats is never 
certain. If a seat filled through regional or national lists is vacated, the party 
that held it will simply appoint a new MP. The internal movement of party 
parliamentary groups can bring about changes that significantly affect Parlia-
ment’s balance of power. Parliamentary law, including Hungary’s Standing 
Orders, tolerates this movement, for the principle of the unrestricted mandate 
includes the freedom to resign from a party group and move to another one. In 
turn the principle of the autonomy of the party parliamentary groups allows 
groups to expel Members and accept new ones who apply to join. (Standing 
Orders Article 14 and 15.) The constitutional principle of the unrestricted man-
date also means that resignation or expulsion does n t terminate the mandate. 
Instead, the MP becomes an independent.  
One form of binding an MP to the party and its parliamentary group that is 
known and used involves having the MP sign a loyalty declaration when nomi-
nated or a statement of resignation from office that is undated. An MP who 
retracted the declaration of resignation dated after th  fact and delivered to the 
Speaker by the leader of the party parliamentary group set a precedent. Parlia-
ment ruled that the Member’s mandate was not terminated, based on the prin-
ciple of the unrestricted mandate. The lesson of the case was that any private 
law contract between the party and the Member that infringes on the unre-
stricted mandate is invalid.57 In other words, public law and politics approach 
resignations and shifts from one party group to another from fundamentally 
different points of view, which they also dispute on moral grounds. Movement 
within Parliament, losses of mandates, and the winning of mandates always 
receive significant echo in the media. This means that an MP who quits one 
party parliamentary group and joins another (the “prson who changes his or 
her colours,” the “defector,” the “deserter”) violates the internal norms of the 
political parties and possibly also political norms, but not parliamentary law. 
Often the shift is expected. When certain MPs take stands in Parliament, some-
times it is quite clear that their positions do notc nform to that of their party, 
and they often vote in opposition to their party, thus violating the rules of their 
parliamentary group. Often an MP resigns from a group to stay a step ahead of 
expulsion. 
There is a high level of freedom to resign from a group and join a different one 
in Hungarian parliamentary law. In fact, there is but one restriction, the six-
month cooling off period when the MP marks time as an independent. This 
restriction was further relaxed by Standing Orders interpretations already cited, 
to the effect that when MPs become independent after collectively leaving a 





wait for six months. Collectively resigning from a p rty parliamentary group is 
possible, thanks to the unrestricted mandate, but recognizing it without hesita-
tion can violate election day will based on the sovereignty of the people, even 
if the electorate agrees with the group tendering the resignation from the party 
group as opposed to a party parliamentary group or party itself that has not kept 
its election promises. The logical outcome of this substantial legal freedom (for 
there can be numerous other social, political or personal reasons to resign and 
transfer to another group) is that movement from one party parliamentary 
group to another within the Hungarian Parliament is quite significant (see ta-
ble).58 (For instance, in the 1990-1994 term – if we include fluctuation – 21 
percent of the Parliament had switched from its original seating order to an-
other location by the end of the term.) 
Should we or can we limit the freedom to resign andswitch groups? I believe 
so, for this freedom is not unlimited. It is appropriate to use refined legal means 
to protect the results of an election and the composition of a Parliament. These 
protective tools include maintenance of the structure of a Parliament once it has 
been formed, retention of government stability, andvoidance of government 
crises. 
With respect to the practice of resigning from one party parliamentary group 
and switching to another, I would like to mention three areas that should be 
restricted. These limits are an attempt to govern how many times an MP may 
switch. For instance, should a party parliamentary group have authority to ad-
mit an MP who is switching allegiances for a third time, in other words, a per-
son who has been a member of every single party group serving in the given 
Parliament? (In 1994-1998, thirteen MPs switched groups twice and two 
switched three times.) If the Standing Orders are int rpreted in the strict sense 
of the term, that should not be possible. Under Standing Orders Article 14. the 
main rule of a party parliamentary group is that it is made up of MPs who are 
members of the same party. An MP is considered to bel ng to a party of which 
he or she is a member or which supported him or her w n he or she was run-
ning for election, and finally – in my view this rule is the exception – an MP 
who is independent or has become independent and is then accepted by a party 
parliamentary group. The latter – in my interpretation – is valid for an MP who 
was originally an independent and for an MP who resigned or was expelled 
from a party parliamentary group a single time. Accepting the interpretation 
that allows extensive freedom in switching and joining groups erodes the prin-
ciple of membership in the same party. 
Responding to the question of when one may switch groups, we see that such 
switches occur more often towards the end of a term, and the party parliamen-
tary group that becomes the recipient of the switches is the one is believed to 
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have the greatest chance of winning the next election. The party parliamentary 
groups also make an effort to recruit individuals that have a good chance of 
winning individual constituencies. (In 1990-1994, for instance, six Members of 
Parliament switched groups twice as elections approached.) I agree with the 
idea of establishing stricter time restrictions on the freedom to switch groups 
and that an MP who leaves a group in the final year of a term should have to 
remain an independent until the end of that term.59 I would leave the question 
of which group an MP can switch to open, but I do ask whether an MP who 
resigns from a government party parliamentary group can join another group at 
will if accepted, such as an opposition party’s group, or vice versa. Is this free-
dom all right under public law, considering the will expressed on election day? 
12. We cannot deny the existence of independents 
It is clear from the table that by the end of its term, there are a significant num-
ber of independents in Parliament (in the four terms of Parliament to date, the 
number of independents at the end of the term of office was 28, 23, 20, and 12). 
These data do not give us a full picture of the real number of independent MPs 
since independence is a temporary status that lasts for a longer or shorter inter-
val. For instance, between 1994 and 1998 a total of 37 MPs were independent 
at one time or another. There is no denying that independence in a multi-party 
Parliament is an atypical though existing form of parliamentary practice. We 
immediately have to add that members of political parties may also choose to 
sit among the independents. For instance, towards the end of the 1994-1998 
term of office there were ten parties in Parliament who professed to be repre-
sented by at least one independent MP. A good point t  remember is that inde-
pendent MPs are also independent of one another. 
So then, do we have to protect parliamentary democracy from the independents 
or the independents against discrimination and parliamentary law practices that 
treat them in an antidemocratic manner? The latter may be the protection that is 
important and relevant from the aspect of constitutional law. 
Act XXXIV of 1989 on the election of Members of Parli ment sets up 176 
individual constituencies, which makes it possible under public law for inde-
pendents to win mandates, something that is true even if they do not have too 
much chance of winning. The principle of the freedom f mandates, despite its 
limitations, makes it possible for MPs to be independent, so parliamentary law 
recognizes the independent status of MPs. In subsection 6 of this paper above I 
mentioned that there were two extreme models in connection with independ-
ents. One recognizes the idea of making up a parliamentary group of independ-





other denies independents the right to participate in groups (the Netherlands, 
for instance). There are numerous configurations betwe n the two, ones that 
often guarantee group rights.60 
Effective Hungarian regulations tend to offer a mixed solution closer to the 
model which rejects independents, and for that reason it should be sharply 
criticized. Although the Standing Orders recognize independence, it does not 
really give independents any rights, sometimes including individual rights. (For 
instance, Standing Orders Article 53 (3) (d); Article 59; Article 101 (3) and 
Article 115 (3).) Standing Orders Article 115 (3) is a good example of the spirit 
of the regulations: “The House Committee shall provide independent Members 
of Parliament with the opportunity to put direct issues to cabinet members and 
raise questions in keeping with their numbers.” Considering the fact that the 
right to ask questions is the constitutional right of every single Member of Par-
liament, this regulation in the Standing Orders cannot be called a constitutional 
solution that guarantees the equality of MPs. Having studied the history of 
raising direct issues with cabinet members, to my knowledge such issues must 
be responded to in the order in which they are regist red in the issue ledger. 
The right to raise issues with cabinet members is not a right linked to party 
group membership. According to Standing Orders Article 18 (2), independent 
MPs may join with one another and establish a group, should they wish to do 
so. However, this group, similarly to professional, regional, and other groups, 
does not qualify as a party parliamentary group and therefore, it does not have 
the same rights. I believe that a group of independents is more like a quasi 
party group and differs fundamentally from all other types of group from the 
point of view of participatory rights. For this reason, the spokesperson for a 
group of independents that corresponds to a party prliamentary group in num-
ber should be granted a legal status similar to (not identical to!) that of the head 
of a party parliamentary group in the various institutions (for instance, in the 
House Committee, in addressing Parliament before beginning debate on the 
agenda, in reviving legislative initiatives, etc.).  
The issue of equality under the law and of legal sttu  must be separated from 
the issue of whether independents may establish parliamentary groups equiva-
lent in legal status to the party parliamentary groups. I believe that they do not 
have this right. Parliamentary law has to solve the issues of legal status and the 
equality of participation independently of parliamentary group formation. At 
present the independents are a disadvantaged group from the point of view of 
both their individual and their group rights, and are treated as though they 
didn’t even exist in parliamentary law.61 The Constitutional Court ruling al-
ready cited several times, which concluded that Hungarian Standing Orders 
need to provide guarantees for the independents, call  attention to this uncon-
stitutional situation. According to Subsection 3 of the executive portion of the 
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ruling “There is an unconstitutionality of omission insofar as the Standing Or-
ders do not contain any stipulation guaranteeing that Members of Parliament 
who do not belong to any parliamentary group may actually become members 
of Parliament’s standing and ad hoc committees, and in particular it does not 
regulate the right to participate extended to all Members and to distribute 
places in a proportionate manner. The Constitutional Court calls on the Parlia-
ment to meet this legislative obligation by Septembr 1, 1998.” The grounds 
given for the ruling state that regulations that consider only the interests related 
to the operations of party parliamentary groups andwhich essentially deny 
Members who are outside these parliamentary groups the authorities needed to 
perform their work are not constitutional. “It is derived from the equal rights of 
Members of Parliament that every single Member must be assured the opportu-
nity to voice an opinion at the plenary sessions of Parliament, to participate as a 
Member in full standing in the work of the parliamentary committees, and fi-
nally, to form a group.62 Although the deadline for correcting this anomaly was 
September 1, 1998, it continues to exist to this day.
The third level of legislative sources, the parliamentary group rules, has not 
been investigated in this study.63 The content of these norms is akin to that of 
the Standing Orders, and in my view they are closer to parliamentary law than 
to political norms. The argument against this, thate rules of party parliamen-
tary groups “do not have independent legal authority (for Member of Parlia-
ment independence precludes them from having such) is valid.” 64 At the same 
time, with the concept of the constitutionality of the party parliamentary groups 
as our point of departure it is also true that a constitutional institution, the work 
order of Parliament, comprises the rules. Standing Orders serving as authoriza-
tion are not inconceivable with respect to the party parliamentary groups – 
which is natural for the committees regulated in detail by parliamentary law 
(see Standing Orders Article 81 (1) – under which the party parliamentary 
groups establish their orders of procedure on the basis of the provisions of the 
Standing Orders. This authorization brings the party parliamentary group rules 
closer to the Standing Orders. The principle that party parliamentary group 
rules must be public has also to be declared. 
* * * 
In summing up the regulatory situation, we can say th t following the constitu-
tional regime change, Hungary is evolving a modern parliamentary law and law 
of parliamentary groups which is quite similar to that of European parliamen-
tary democracies in its make-up. At the same time, th re are numerous gaps in 
the law and contradictions of regulation and interpr tation about which de lege 
ferenda decisions should be taken with a two-thirds majority, with particular 
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SUMMARY 
Party Groups in Hungarian Parliamentary Law 
ISTVÁN KUKORELLI 
The essay introduces the present state of Hungarian parliamentary law with a 
focus on the law of parliamentary groups of Members of Parliament against the 
background of the Constitution, the Standing Orders and parliamentary custom. 
The author reveals loopholes and inner inconsistencies in relevant regulations.  
The parliamentary groups of MPs are constitutional i stitutions and not party 
organs, the author states. To confirm his point, he ref rs to the history of those 
groups, relevant provisions in the Constitution andresolutions of the Constitu-
tional Court. In fact, he defines parliamentary groups as fundamental building 
blocks of modern multi-party parliaments.  
The Hungarian Standing Orders deal with parliamentary groups under two 
main headings: the norms of the organization of parliamentary groups (their 
formation, termination, the exclusion of members, etc.) and the enumeration of 
the rights that parliamentary groups may exercise. Modern Standing Orders 
tend to lay emphasis on parliamentary group rights ra her than the rights of 
individual Members of Parliament, and they include safeguards for the rights of 
the Opposition.  
The second part of the essay addresses four issues on the basis of parliamentary 
case law. They are as follows: the opportunity to form a parliamentary group in 
the course of parliamentary periods (as opposed to doing so at the beginning of 
such a period), the termination of parliamentary groups, changes in the seating 
order of MPs (as a result of MPs leaving a parliamentary group to join another 
one) and, finally, the case of cross-benchers. On the basis of de lege ferenda, 
the author makes numerous recommendations for the legislator, who in several 
questions has brought about unconstitutionality in th s field by failing to fulfil 






Fraktionen im ungarischen parlamentarischen Recht 
ISTVÁN KUKORELLI 
Die Studie stellt die derzeitige Situation des ungarischen parlamentarischen 
Rechts, genauer die Regelung des Fraktionsrechts vor. Dabei nimmt sie auf die 
Verfassung, die Hausordnung und das parlamentarische Gewohnheitsrecht 
Bezug, und weist auch auf die Gesetzeslücken, sowie die Widersprüche bezüg-
lich der Regelung und Interpretation hin. 
Der Meinung des Verfassers zufolge sei die Fraktion eine verfassungsmäßige 
Institution und kein Parteiorgan – dies folge aus der historischen Entwicklung, 
dem Erscheinen der Vorschriften auf Verfassungsebene und aus den Interpre-
tationen des Verfassungsgerichts. Die Fraktion sei – so der Verfasser – die 
Grundlage des auf dem Parteipluralismus basierenden modernen Parlaments. 
In den Hausordnungen können hinsichtlich der Fraktionen zwei große Rege-
lungsbereiche angeführt werden: einerseits die mit der Organisation der Frakti-
onen (Bildung, Auflösung, Ausschluss usw.) zusammenhängenden Normen, 
andererseits der Katalog der Fraktionsrechte. Die modernen Hausordnungen 
bauen anstelle der individuellen Abgeordnetenrechte immer mehr auf die Frak-
tionsrechte und wahren zudem auch die Rechte der Opposition. 
Der zweite Teil der Studie beschäftigt sich auf Grund des parlamentarischen 
Fallrechts mit vier Fragen: mit der Möglichkeit der Fraktionsbildung während 
der Parlamentsperiode, der Auflösung der Fraktionen, den Änderungen der 
parlamentarischen Sitzordnung (Austritte, Platzwechs l usw.), schließlich mit 
der Angelegenheit der Unabhängigen. Der Verfasser formuliert auf Grund des 
Fallrechts de lege ferenda zahlreiche Vorschläge für den Gesetzgeber, der hin-
sichtlich mehrerer Fragen wegen Versäumnis der Rechtssetzung Verfassungs-
widrigkeit herbeigeführt hat. 
